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Abstract 
The need of institutional investors to evaluate the corporate governance (CG) 
practices of the listed companies resulted in many attempts to construct CG rating 
methodologies. This paper, in response to this situation, presents an attempt to 
quantify the compliance of large capitalisation Greek companies with international 
best practices. The methodology consisted in the creation of a questionnaire 
reflecting the Greek CG code, which basically replicate the OECD Principles. Other, 
well-regarded CG codes were taken into account. Then, we constructed a rating 
system based on CG indicators and we applied it for the years 2001 and 2003. The 
total rating results for the years 2001 and 2003 demonstrated a relatively 
satisfactory improvement. The highest compliance is in the category of shareholder 
rights, while weak compliance appears in the last category, which incorporates 
commitment to CG, CSR and the relations with shareholders. The exercise, using 
practically all agreed principles of the OECD, could demonstrate a reasonable degree 
of compliance of the average company rated. Its limitation in that respect is that it 
could not satisfy investigations on convergence. The indicators used were highly 
pertinent to measure compliance, but not convergence, which was not within the 
initial targets and would need a longer time series analysis. Our methodology applies 
in a small open economy and may have significant implications in other similar 
capital markets. Methodologically, the merit of the exercise lies in its approach 
toward the creation of "collectively subjective" weightings, and is valuable to 
institutional investors, policymakers, regulators and academics. 
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The upgrading of the Greek capital market to mature market status and the global 
competition for capital has boosted the CG debate in Greece. In addition, the recent 
corporate failures and financial scandals around the world have increase awareness 
that proper corporate governance (CG) is fundamental to the efficient operation of 
capital markets. The need of institutional investors to evaluate the CG practices of 
the listed companies resulted in many attempts to construct CG rating 
methodologies. This paper, in response to this situation, presents an attempt to 
quantify the compliance of large capitalisation Greek companies with international 
best practices. Firstly, we review the literature on CG ratings. Secondly, we present a 
brief history of the CG in Greece. Then, we present the structure of our CG rating 
methodology and the results. Finally, we summarize the findings and proceed with 
some critical points. 
 
 
Literature on corporate governance ratings  
Corporate governance (CG) has been a widely discussed issue among academics, 
capital markets' regulators, international organizations and the business world. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), define CG as the way in which the suppliers of finance to 
corporation assure adequate returns on their investments. Agency theory is the 
fundamental reference in CG. The agency problems vary, depending on the 
ownership characteristics of each country. In countries with dispersed ownership 
structure (mainly the US and the UK) the separation of ownership and control, as 
posed by Berle and Means (1932), refers to the inherent conflicting interests of 
opportunistic managers and owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Williamson 1985). Investors usually use their exit options if they disagree with 
the management or if they are disappointed by the company's performance, 
signalling - through share prices reduction - the necessity for managers to improve 
firm performance (Hirschman, 1970). On the other hand, in countries with 
concentrated ownership structure (continental Europe, Japan and other OECD 
countries), large dominant shareholders usually control managers and expropriate 
minority shareholders, in order to extract private control benefits. The agency 
problem of CG is therefore posed as how to align the interests of strong blockholders 
and weak minority shareholders (Becht, 1997). 
 
In a period of volatile and uncertain markets, as shown by the recent corporate 
failures and poor governance structures, demanding institutional investors seek to 
place their funds in well-governed companies. Mainstream investors tend to 
examine and include in their overall investment strategy whether companies comply 
with specific internationally accepted CG standards. At the same time, as more 
investors evaluate CG when purchasing stocks and mutual funds, an increasing 
number of listed companies feel the pressure to take actions in order to adopt 
efficient CG policies and practices. As a response to the increase in demand for CG 
evaluations, some investment research firms and academic institutions are now 
developing CG rating services. A corporate governance score is derived mainly by 
analyzing to what extent a company adopts codes and guidelines of generally 
accepted CG best practices, and the extent to which local laws, regulations, and 
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market conditions encourage or discourage corporate governance practices (Spanos, 
2005; Xanthakis et al., 2003). 
 
There are a few firms and academic institutions offering domestic and/or cross-
border CG ratings. Ratings are usually based on domestic and global CG codes and 
try to determine whether listed companies comply with those standards and best 
practice rules. Deminor has developed a methodology based on more than 300 CG 
indicators and offers solicited CG ratings. Its services, which cover the main Western 
European markets, include also investment advice on corporate transaction, proxy 
voting recommendation and shareholder activism (Deminor, 2001). 
GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) has also developed a CG rating system based 
on both public data sources and private information (e.g. in-depth interviews with 
senior management and board members). GMI rating criteria are based on more 
than 600 data points per company that cut across seven categories: board 
accountability, financial disclosure, shareholder rights, compensation policies, 
market for control, shareholder base and corporate reputation. The structure of the 
rating system follows a number of international codes, such as those developed by 
the OECD, the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance and the 
Business Roundtable. Companies are rated on a scale of 1-10 relative to one another 
(Sherman, 2004). Standard & Poor's (S&P's), the world-leading rating company, 
launch in 2001 a new service (Corporate Governance Scores). A company Corporate 
Governance Score (CGS) reflects S&P's assessment of a company's CG practices and 
policies and involves the analysis of public and non-public information. The S&P's 
evaluation system analyses four key components: ownership structure and 
influence, shareholder rights and stakeholder relations, financial transparency and 
information disclosure and board structure and process (Standard & Poor's, 2001; 
Bradley, 2004). The Corporate Governance Authority, a Brussels based company 
founded in 2000, offers corporate governance ratings worldwide. The rating system 
includes 225 questions which are integrated into ten broad categories. The 
indicators are based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) and 
incorporate both public and non-public information (Corporate Governance 
Authority, 2002). In 2000, the German Society of Financial Analysts (DVFA) 
developed a "Scorecard for German Corporate Governance" (DVFA, 2000), based on 
the German code of best practices. The scorecard is divided into seven criteria: 
corporate governance commitment, shareholders and the general meeting, 
cooperation between management board and supervisory board, management 
board, supervisory board, transparency and reporting and audit of the annual 
financial statements. In the German scorecard, each indicator is weighted by a 
suggested "standard weighting" but also allows the reflection of individual weighting 
differences. The German approach is applied in many countries in East Asian (e.g. 
Indonesia and Philippines) and in Latin America (Strenger, 2004). 
 
Most of the empirical studies examine the correlation of specific CG aspects and 
firms' market value or performance. A relative limited number of studies use a CG 
index in order to examine whether governance practices affect firm's market value. 
Black (2001) examined the relationship between CG behaviour and market value for 
a sample of 21 Russian firms by using CG rankings developed by the Brunswick 
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Warburg investment bank. A worst to best CG improvement predicts a 700-fold 
increase in firm value. The author reported a powerful correlation between the 
market value and CG of Russian firms. Durnev and Kim (2003) found that higher 
scores on both the CLSA CG index and the S&P disclosure and transparency index 
predict higher firm value for a sample of 859 large firms in 27 countries. Gompers et 
al. (2003) showed the existence of a striking relationship between CG and stock 
returns. The authors used the incidence of 24 different provisions (primarily 
takeover deafness) of 1500 US firms measured between 1990 and 1999 to build a 
"Governance Index" and then they studied the relationship between this index and 
firm performance. The "Governance Index" is highly correlated with firm value. The 
study also evidenced that "an investment strategy that bought firms with the 
strongest shareholder rights and sold those with the weakest would have earned 
abnormal returns of 8.5 per cent per year". Klapper and Love (2002) used data on 
firm-level CG rankings across 14 emerging markets and found a wide variation in 
firm-level governance across countries. Black et al. (2003) constructed a multifactor 
CG index based primarily on responses to a survey of all listed companies by the 
Korea Stock Exchange. They found a strong positive correlation between the overall 
CG index and firm market value, which is robust across OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS 
regressions, in subsamples, in alternate specifications of the CG index, and with 
alternate measures of firm value. 
 
 
A brief history of the evolution of corporate governance in Greece 
Traditionally Greek companies were, and most of them still remain, family owned. 
Family members were also board members and the company's executives. This kind 
of structure did not give rise to thoughts on efficient corporate governance (CG), 
such as there existed no agency problems between the owners and the 
management. However, the significant use of IPO's as means for raising capital in the 
late 1990's turned these companies from private-family owned to public listed 
companies, offered the first sign that the long lasting operating methods had to be 
reconsidered. The speculative events in the Greek capital market during 1999 led the 
Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC), the main independent regulatory 
decision-making body, and the state to take an active role, introducing rules, 
regulations and codes of conduct. All these measures were aiming at the protection 
of investors against market abuse, the improvement of the transparency of the 
market and the establishment of appropriate business ethics. The discussion on CG 
in Greece is focused mainly toward protecting individual and minority shareholders' 
interests that are practically cut off from the decision making process of the firm 
(Mertzanis, 2001; Spanos et al., 2004; Spanos, 2005). 
 
Corporate governance appeared as an issue in Greece in the mid-1990s through an 
introductory paper published by the Stock Exchange. The first, however, major step 
toward the formation of a comprehensive framework on corporate governance has 
been the publication of the "Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece" on 
October 1999 by an ad hoc committee co-ordinated by the HCMC (Committee on 
Corporate Governance in Greece, 1999). The Greek code contains 44 
recommendations compiled on seven main categories: 
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- The rights and obligations of shareholders 
- The equitable treatment of shareholders 
- The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
- Transparency, disclosure of information and auditing 
- The board of directors 
- The non-executive members of the board of directors 
- Executive management 
 
The principles and best practice rules incorporated were closely modelled according 
to OECD Principles on Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999). This, combined with an 
announced intention of the Ministry of the Economy to amend the corporate law to 
incorporate additional CG elements that would then become mandatory, triggered 
an open controversy between the representatives of the industrial federations and 
the state. The former confirmed their belief in CG principles and support that 
voluntarily complies is a sufficient incentive and thus firms should be self-regulated. 
The Federation promoted its own code of conduct for its members. In May 2002 the 
Ministry of the Economy amended the corporate law and incorporated fundamental 
CG obligations. The legislative framework of the Greek capital market is now fully 
harmonised with the guidelines and directives of the EU. Although improvements in 
CG have occurred in Greece, they are mainly confined to a small number of large 
listed companies that are more in tune with the international corporate stage. 
 
 
The corporate governance rating system methodology 
 
The approach 
As the CG debate became a hot issue in 2000, the Center of Financial Studies in the 
Department of Economics of the University of Athens launched a project financed by 
the Stock Exchange, aiming at a pilot CG rating. The target of the project was to 
develop a methodology on CG rating and apply it to a broad number of companies 
on a voluntary basis (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004). Specific targets were:  
 
- To provide an independent and reliable tool for all investors who believe that a 
thorough examination of CG practices will lead to increased long-term shareholder 
value. The importance of the tool increases in a framework of a small open capital 
market that aims to attract sophisticated international investors. 
- To provide a comprehensive and specific rating regarding all CG criteria for each 
company, enabling firms to use their individual results in order to measure 
themselves against several benchmarks (high, average, sectoral average). 
- To produce useful results of aggregated data for the relevant authorities (e.g. the 
Stock Exchange, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission) and create an aggregate 
score for the Greek listed companies participating, thus demonstrating strengths and 
weaknesses to be taken into account for policy making. 
- Form a basis for comparison with future exercises and offer a tool that will allow 
correlation of the results with stock value and profitability to check the extent to 
which investors pay a premium for companies with high ratings. 
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One of the main contributions of the project was the consensus that resulted from a 
very close collaboration between the Stock Exchange (which financed the study and 
had a vivid interest in practical results), an academic research centre (which could 
guarantee methodology and impartiality) and representatives of market participants 
(who provided thorough inputs and assured the practical value of the results). In 
order to achieve the highest possible consensus and obtain market-oriented 
outcomes, a Special Advisory Committee on Corporate Governance was convened 
consisting of members of all the relevant agents (the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, the Stock Exchange, the Athens Chamber of Commerce & Industry, the 
Federation of Greek Industries, the Union of Institutional Investors, the Hellenic Bank 
Association, the Brokers' Association) to advise the researchers on practical matters 
related to their work. The Committee met as relevant milestones were reached, and 
commented or recommended additional work. 
 
The structure 
The methodology consisted in the creation of a questionnaire reflecting the five 
chapters of the Greek CG voluntary code, which basically replicate the structure of 
the OECD Principles (1999). Other, well-regarded corporate governance codes were 
also taken into account. The answers to this questionnaire were integrated into a 
number of indicators, which did not have a 1:1 correspondence to the questions. The 
indicators were then assigned with weightings, depending on their priority, so that a 
composite final overall score could be obtained. More specifically the questionnaire 
consisted of five main category-indicators: (i) the rights and obligations of 
shareholders, (ii) transparency, disclosure of information and auditing, (iii) the board 
of directors, (iv) executive management, and (v) corporate governance commitment, 
the role of stakeholders and corporate social responsibility. 
 
The total number of questions was 54, categorised into questions, which directly 
lead to indicators suitable for the CG rating (32 questions), questions combined into 
one indicator (16 questions leading to five indicators only) and questions used for 
clarification and control not leading to any indicator (six questions). Of the former 
32, five questions received ipso facto the highest score because they refer to issues 
that are mandatory in the existing regulatory framework. The reason the latter were 
included was to show potential international investors that all listed firms in the 
Greek market comply with these minimum standards.  
 
The questions were thus integrated into 37 indicators, of which six were for 
shareholder rights, nine for transparency, 12 for the Board, five for the CEO and the 
executives and five for general issues like corporate social responsibility. In 2004, an 
updated version of the scorecard was issued to follow the Greek law on CG that had 
been published by the Ministry of Economy, as well as the recent trends of the 






Content of the main criteria 
The rights and obligations of shareholders: The criterion reviews all relevant issues 
related to the equal treatment of shareholders, like one-share one vote principle, 
confidential voting, voting procedures and absence of takeover defence. 
 
Transparency, disclosure of information and auditing: This checks the extent to 
which all shareholders are equally and regularly informed, international accounting 
standards are in place, efficient risk management system exist etc. The criterion also 
focuses on sufficient disclosure of the board members' and executives' remuneration 
and deals with conflicts of interests between external and internal auditors. 
 
The board of directors: This criterion evaluates board structures and functions, like 
CEO duality, board independence, board size and meetings frequency, board 
committees, new board members' rotation and training, non-executive directors' 
remuneration, non-executive directors' election frequency etc. 
 
Executive management: The emphasis is on the duties and responsibilities of the 
CEO, executive managements' and CEO compensation, full information on stock 
options etc.  
 
Corporate governance commitment, the role of stakeholders and corporate social 
responsibility: The final criterion includes a mix of factors related to the external 
position of the firm. We were concerned that emphasis on issues like stakeholder 
rights or social responsibility might create a reluctance of companies to cooperate, 
as there has been a clear tension between managers and shareholders on the one 
side and government on the other in earlier years on such issues. While in the last 
decade this tension has diminished, it was decided to limit question of this type to a 
minimum and also to attribute very low weightings. 
 
Calculation and weighting 
Weighting was the greatest difficulty, as it inevitably had to include subjective 
judgements. The way we proceeded was to first have each of the senior members of 
the research team individually assign priorities amongst and within each category. 
Fortunately, their assigned priorities coincided to a large degree, and where they did 
not, agreement could be reached after discussion. Then, a score of 0 (inadequate), 1 
(intermediate) and 2 (top performance) was assigned per indicator. These weightings 
were presented to the Advisory Committee and were confirmed or altered to reflect 
the priorities and the evaluation of the participants in the market. The highest 
weighting was assigned in the category of transparency and disclosure, followed by 
the shareholder rights, the board of directors, the executive management and CSR. 
 
 
Corporate governance rating for the large Greek listed companies 
 
Sample and data 
The dataset includes public information on 27 different corporate governance 
indicators for the 20 biggest companies (based on the capitalization) in 2001 and 
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2003, as they figure in the corresponding list of the Stock Exchange (ASE/FTSE-20). 
The companies included in our sample represent more that 70% of the capitalisation 




The total rating results for the years 2001 and 2003, shown in Table I, demonstrated 
a relatively satisfactory improvement (77.8% and 81.1% respectively). The highest 
compliance in the Greek market is in the category of shareholder rights, followed by 
CEO/Executive management and transparency. The Board of Directors category had 
a medium compliance score, while weak compliance appears in the last category, 
which incorporates external factors like commitment to CG, corporate social 
responsibility and the relations with shareholders. This ranking of the categories is 
also influenced by the impact of mandatory provisions, which are concentrated in 
the categories with the highest compliance score. 
 
----- take in Table I ---- 
 
Shareholders rights appear to be well protected in Greece (Table II). The one-share 
one-vote rule is legally imposed. During the course of time the CG ratings have been 
improved (94.3% in the 2001 survey and 100% in the 2003 survey). Transparency and 
disclosure practices are of a quite high quality (Table III), with in-time and 
understandable publication of the financial statements, and equal treatment of all 
investors and financial analysts regarding information dissemination for important 
corporate events. 
 
----- take in Table II ---- 
----- take in Table III ---- 
 
Weaker compliance is observed in the disclosure of managerial remuneration (52.9% 
in the 2001 survey and 57.5% in the 2003 survey), the application of the IAS (firms 
employing the IAS or the US-GAAP are those listed in foreign stock exchanges – 
58.8% in 2001 and 60.0% in 2003) and the disclosure of company's risk management 
policy (58.8% in 2001 and 60.0% in 2003). In the category "The board of directors", 
presented in Table IV, large capitalization companies performed better in the 2003 
survey compared with the 2001 survey (70.5% and 67.9% respectively). A note-
worthy feature is that Greek firms seem to have a universal problem in the 
frequency of changing non-executive directors. The introduction of the new law on 
CG in July 2002 increased the number of non-executive and independent directors. 
Moreover, firms perform better in the establishment of board committees’ indicator 
(47.1% in 2001 and 62.5% in 2003). Table V presents ratings of the CEO and 
executive management and shows that the FTSE/ASE-20 firms perform very well 
(81.1% in 2001 and 84.7% in 2003). The weakens lies in disclosure of share 
ownership information of the executive management. 
 
----- take in Table IV ---- 
----- take in Table V ---- 
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It came as no surprise that the degree of compliance is relatively low (Table VI) in the 
last category that incorporates CSR and stakeholders issues (56.3% in the 2001 
survey and 63.1% in the 2003 survey). 
 
----- take in Table VI ---- 
 
 
Conclusions and further research 
The main conclusion drawn from this survey was that overall Greek companies 
demonstrate a fairly satisfactory degree of compliance with OECD CG principle. The 
introduction of the new CG law in July 2002 had a positive impact on the CG rating 
results. However, there is still quite weak compliance concerning the role of 
stakeholders and CSR, the non-executive directors' election frequency, disclosure of 
remuneration and CEO/Chair split. The merits and the limitations of the work 
undertaken can be summarized around four main areas: 
 
- Raising the issue: Following the increased interest on CG internationally and the 
upgrade of the Greek market, the work undertaken really raised the issue and 
helped shape a discussion on the potential merits of CG. 
 
- Demonstrating market compliance: The exercise using practically all agreed 
principles of the OECD could demonstrate a reasonable degree of compliance of the 
average company rated. Its limitation in that respect is that it could not satisfy 
investigations on convergence. The indicators used were highly pertinent to measure 
compliance, but not convergence, which was not within the initial targets and would 
need a longer time series analysis. 
 
- Using "collective subjectivity" for the attribution of weightings: The Greek 
methodology for the creation and valuation of weightings was different to those 
used by academic publication or credit rating exercises. The idea of an academic 
suggestion validated by all market participants was an effort to substitute for the 
impossibility of longer term econometric testing. In the absence of initial data, this 
method presents the advantage of passing the market test. It also contains a 
dynamic aspect of change overtime, as attitudes and trends change in the particular 
market. Weightings can be adapted accordingly. While inevitably subjective, these 
weightings took a more objective character through their validation by 
representatives from the market. We believe that our innovative approach leading 
"collective subjectivity" may be a good methodology substituting for the absence of 
databases, in particular for smaller markets, where this exercise is easier to 
undertake. 
 
- Identifying the potential to diversify tools based on the inputs used: As a first step 
one can undertake scoring based on public domain information and make 
comparative exercise that allow ranking firms or markets. If one wants to go deeper 
into the investigation of CG quality in a firm, then it is necessary to enrich the 
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exercise with more indicators that are customized and result from in-depth research 
and interviews. 
 
The rating attempt started practically in one type of a market (emerging with 
spectacular rises in stock prices) and ended up in a totally different one: during the 
18 months that it took to design the methodology, test it, validate it and apply it to 
the sample used, the Greek market was upgraded to a developed market and the 
Stock Exchange suffered higher losses than the average of all developed markets. In 
this context, needs, prospects and expectations from this exercise changed and led 
to different requests from the various participants involved. These requests led to 
new discussions on how the existing indicators could be valorised by alternative 
calculations or how they could be enriched in the future to cover the newly 
emerging requests. 
 
Our sample contains large capitalization quoted companies. Moreover, some of the 
companies are internationally quoted. For them, the interest does not lie in their 
comparison with Greek companies or with basic OECD principles, but on their 
potential to compete for funds globally. Finally, our approach could be applied in 
many small open economies. This particularly applies to counties that still have to 































Table I: Total CG rating results based on public domain information  
for the FTSE/ASE-20 companies (maximum=100%) 
Corporate governance indicator 2001 2003 
The rights and the obligations of 
shareholders 
94.3 100.0 
Transparency, disclosure of 
information and auditing 
80.1 81.4 
The board of directors 67.9 70.5 
CEO and executive management 81.1 84.7 
Corporate governance 
commitment, the role of 
stakeholders and corporate social 
responsibility 
56.3 63.1 




Table II: The rights and the obligations of shareholders (maximum100%) 
Corporate governance indicator 2001 2003 
The equal treatment of 
shareholders 
100.0 100.0 
Absence of takeover defense 94.1 100.0 




Voting procedures in the GMS 100.0 100.0 
Mechanisms of sufficient and timely 
information about the dates, place 
and 
agenda of the GMS 
86.8 100.0 
Mechanisms through which 
shareholders are sufficiently and 
timely informed on the proposals 
submitted in the agenda of the 
GMS 
91.2 100.0 













Table III: Transparency, disclosure of information and auditing (maximum100%) 
Corporate governance indicator 2001 2003 
Report of the annual and semi-annual 
financial statements with clear and 
understandable way 
100.0 100.0 
In time publish of the annual and semi-
annual financial statement 
100.0 100.0 
Equal treatment of all investors and 
financial analysts regarding information 
dissemination (fair disclosure) for 
important corporate events 
100.0 100.0 
Detailed analysis of any deviation from 
previously announced earnings targets 
and strategic goal 
88.2 90.0 
Application of an internationally 
recognized accounting and auditing 
system for the balance sheet consistent 
with the IAS 
58.8 60.0 
Disclosure of board directors and 
executive staff members' remuneration 
52.9 57.5 
Specific discussion of the company’s 
risk management system on the annual 
report 
58.8 60.0 






Table IV: The Board of directors (maximum=100%) 
Corporate governance indicator 2001 2003 
Division between the role of the 
chairman and the CEO 
29.4 45.0 
The composition of the board of 
directors 
88.2 88.8 
Non-executive board directors' 
independence 
76.7 80.0 
The size of the board of directors 88.0 60.0 
Board meetings frequency 100.0 100.0 
Establishment of board committees 47.1 62.5 
Non-executive board directors' 
election frequency 
0.0 0.0 







Table V: CEO and executive management (maximum=100%) 
Corporate governance indicator 2001 2003 
The duties and responsibilities of 
the CEO 
100.0 100.0 
Disclosure of share ownership of 
the executive management staff 
members 
52.9 60.0 
Existence of position of Chief 
Financial Officer 
88.2 90 





Table VI: CG commitment, the role of stakeholders and CSR (maximum=100%) 
Corporate governance indicator 2001 2003 
Existence of written CG rules in the 
company 
41.2 42.5 
Existence of a Corporate 
Governance Committee or 
individual entrusted with CG 
compliance issues 
29.4 55.0 
Existence of an efficient CG 
framework taking account the 
interests of all stakeholders 
64.7 62.5 
Corporate social responsibility 
and environmental awareness 
97.1 97.5 
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